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Introduction
The most significant structural change undergone
by the British and Swiss economies during the past
25 years (1975–2000) is indisputably the
development of their financial systems. From this
point of view, the two countries show a number of
similarities: the presence of one or more
international financial market(s), large enterprises
(LEs) which expanded greatly on the international
front during that period, the decline of their
industrial regions, a monetarist-type monetary
policy that involved floating their currency on the
external market, a more or less enthusiastic policy of
liberalizing their financial markets, etc. In these two
countries, the development of international financial
centres and the decline of the industrial regions took
place in parallel. The question that remains is: are
these developments linked?
There have been many studies dealing with the
relationship between finance and industry. This article
is original, however, in that it approaches the question
principally from the spatial angle (by contrasting the
evolution of the financial centres with that of the other
regions) and from the sectoral angle (by making a dis-
tinction between finance and the industrial activities).
Theories that deal with these problems while
taking the spatialities of finance into account are
rare. But can it not be argued that the liberalization
of capital movement corresponds, first and
foremost, to an increase in their spatial mobility? Is
liquidity not the capacity of financial players to
withdraw their capital and reinvest it elsewhere?
Starting from this premise – that liquidity and
spatial mobility of capital are one and the same
concept – this article will call on various theoretical
approaches while focusing on the way in which they
deal with capital mobility/liquidity.
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The first section compares the evolution of the
Swiss and British economies over the last 30 years or
so. The two countries have been marked by
economic and spatial changes which are relatively
comparable, even though significant institutional
differences still existed in the 1990s.
The second section introduces the notions of
mobility and liquidity and sets out the reforms that
were intended to increase that capital mobility/
liquidity in the UK and in Switzerland. Capital
mobility is central to the neoclassical approach –
neoclassical economists maintain that all the
economic players benefit from the increased mobility
of capital that ensues from a process of liberalization.
But the notion of liquidity has not been the subject
of any particular development in that theory. We will
see that others put forward competing explanations,
liquidity playing, on the contrary, a major part in
economies dominated by financial markets and
reforms being undertaken to promote it.
The third, fourth and fifth sections set out a
number of theories and some explanatory lines of
thinking that enable those similarities in evolution
and those institutional differences to be understood.
In fact, no single theory completely succeeds in
satisfactorily accounting for the spatial and sectoral
evolution observed in the UK and in Switzerland.
For this reason, three different theoretical
approaches are called on, each from the viewpoint of
mobility/liquidity, in order to shed some light on
one or other particular aspect of this evolution.
• The endogenous money approaches place the
emphasis on the banking sector and its power to
create money. The banking sector has a vital role
to play as it opens up the economic circuit and
creates the loan money required to get the
production process started. That being the case,
it is important to know where, and when, the
money filters into the economy. Sheila Dow had
the original idea of linking the endogenous
money concept to spatial issues. She argues for
the idea that the liberalization of capital
movements and a preference for liquidity have
important consequences for the spatial evolution
of the financial system and its capacity to supply,
on an indiscriminate basis, all categories of player
and all regions.
• The increase in mobility/liquidity occurs not
only within a national space, but also between
national spaces. The enormous increase in
international capital movements has considerable
repercussions at sectoral and regional levels via
exchange rates. Regional economists have studied
the sectoral and regional consequences of
exchange-rate variation.
• Finally, for regulationist and/or conventionist
approaches, increased capital mobility/liquidity is
broached via the evolution of the institutions that
control the relationship between financial
markets, banking system and large enterprises .
By taking into account specific national
characteristics, these studies bring to the fore the
influence – marginal or dominant – that
liquidity/mobility exerts in two stylized models
of capitalism.
To conclude, we assess the part played by the
financial sector in the deindustrialization of
countries such as Switzerland and the UK. 
Comparison of evolution of Swiss and
British economies
The Swiss and British economies have undergone
comparable economic and spatial evolutions, despite
some marked institutional differences at the start of
the 1990s.
Comparable economic and spatial evolutions
The rapid development of international financial
metropolises Switzerland and Great Britain have
economies which house a sizeable banking sector.
Thus in 1995, based on an international
comparison, the banking sector in both countries
had a very high share of the total gross added value
created: the figure was 9 percent in Switzerland and
7.2 percent in Great Britain. And this took place
while countries such as the USA (4.6 percent),
Germany (4.1 percent), France (4 percent) and Italy
(2.8 percent) struggled to reach the 5 percent mark
(BAK, 1998).
The Swiss financial market really took off during
the First World War, profiting mainly from the
country’s political neutrality (Guex, 1993). But it
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was during the 1960–70s that the market expanded
once again and confirmed its specialization in
international financial activities.1 In particular, the
Swiss financial centre exports private asset
management services (Blattner et al., 1996). Thus,
according to estimates by Chase Manhattan Bank,
Switzerland manages 35 percent of the world’s
transborder asset management involving private
customers, while, comparatively, Great Britain has
to be content with 21 percent and the USA with a
mere 12 percent. The UBS, the country’s largest
bank, is in fact the world’s leading asset manager.
Moreover, financial activities, particularly
international activities, are not spread
homogenously throughout the national space but are
generally concentrated in a limited number of
metropolitan regions. If regional participation in the
creation of the banking sector’s gross added value is
measured, large variations appear. In Switzerland, in
1995, almost 60 percent of the added value created
by the banks originated in the regions of Zurich and
Geneva. Of those, Zurich is clearly dominant, with a
37.4 percent share (BAK, 1998).
Although the financial centre of London played
a central role within international financial business
at the time when the United Kingdom controlled a
major part of the globe, it lost importance during
the first part of the 20th century in parallel with the
decline of the British Empire and the rise of new,
hegemonic nations. It was only in the 1960s, with
the creation and development of the eurocurrency
markets, that it began to re-emerge as a leading
international centre (Roberts and Kynaston, 2002).
For Great Britain, therefore, the importance of
London as a financial centre surpasses that of
Zurich for Switzerland, since it is estimated that it
concentrates 41 percent of the gross added value
that is created by the banking sector (BAK, 1998).
The internationalization of large enterprises During
the past 30 years, the large Swiss and British
companies have been heavily internationalized; they
have opted for a relocation of production and for
multinationalization by taking over foreign companies.
Thus, at the end of 1995, the 108 largest listed
Swiss companies employed 79 percent of their
personnel (1.17m people) abroad. But it was mainly
the large groups that were getting a foothold on the
global ladder, while the small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) remained confined to the local
level. In 1995, SMEs and public administration
together only employed 265,000 people abroad and
provided the bulk of the positions on Swiss soil
(over 90 percent of jobs) (Kaufmann, 1997).
Switzerland’s outflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) have been growing fast during the
1990s and confirm the process of international-
ization which is impacting on the Swiss economy,
and more particularly its large industrial enterprises.
From this high level, an uninterrupted period of
expansion in foreign investments began in 1993,
reaching hitherto unheard of levels. During the
second part of the 1990s this growth was primarily
due to the large service enterprises.
In the United Kingdom, the movement is
identical. At the beginning of the 1990s we witnessed
a strong growth in outflows of FDI. If we compare
now the levels attained by outflows of FDI in
relation to the GDP in Switzerland and the United
Kingdom we can note that these levels are higher
than in countries such as France and Germany
(Figure 1).
Concentration and dualization in the banking sector In
Switzerland, the financial sector experienced
stability until the end of the 1980s. The start of the
1990s was marked by major structural
transformation, in particular the disappearance of
some regional banks, an accelerated
internationalization of the major banks and the
closure of local stock exchanges. In Switzerland, the
banks, and primarily the major banks, carry the
financial market (Guex and Pasquier-Dorthe, 1996).
They were the root cause of several transformations.
First, there has been a major reduction in the
number of regional banks since the start of the
1990s. The number of regional banks and savings
banks, which stood at 216 in 1985, fell to 204 in
1990 and then plummeted to 127 in 1995. They
numbered just 117 in 1997 (BNS, various years). In
concrete terms, half the regional banks that
disappeared were taken over by another bank in the
same category; and the remainders were acquired by
the major banks and the cantonal banks (ASB,
1999). In this way, the major banks markedly
strengthened their presence in the Swiss market.
Lusser (1996) observes a dualization within the
banking sector itself, between banks with a regional
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vocation and those operating at international level.
By way of comparison, the foreign banks (for
example) had continued to grow. They, being
basically oriented towards international asset
management, saw their numbers rise from 120 in
1985 to 142 in 1990, reaching a figure of 155 
in 1995.
Second, at the same time, the major Swiss banks
accelerated their process of internationalization by
taking over numerous financial institutions, in
particular Anglo-Saxon ones; their objective being
to become global players in world finance. The
largest cantonal banks followed close on their heels.
Third, the local stock exchanges, which existed
in most Swiss towns, were all closed down. Until
1990, Switzerland still had seven securities
exchanges. Four of those closed in the space of two
years. So, in 1992, only three trading floors
remained – Zurich, Geneva and Basel. Even those
ceased to exist with the introduction of on-line
dealing in 1996 (Guex and Pasquier-Dorthe, 1996).
From then on, the majority of transactions took
place in Zurich.
Generally speaking, the 1990s saw the Swiss
banking sector concentrated in the hands of a
reduced number of players, principally through
mergers and takeovers of struggling regional banks.
The number of branches – all banks included – fell
from 4,397 in 1990 to 3,435 in 1997 (ASB, 1999). In
parallel, the leading banks internationalized and
operations in Switzerland became concentrated in
Zurich.
In the United Kingdom, the restructuring of the
banking sector began during the second half of the
1980s – i.e. just a few years ahead of Switzerland –
and tended to accelerate during the 1990s (Leyshon
and Thrift, 1997). Generally speaking, phenomena
identical to those described in Switzerland could be
observed. In fact, the British banking institutions
tended towards rationalization and did not hesitate
to close a number of branches; the growth in
financial activities being particularly marked in
London; the local stock exchanges entered into a
decline; the move to mergers and acquisitions grew;
and power was concentrated in the hands of a
limited number of players.
We should note, however, one element that
distinguishes the case of Switzerland from that of
Britain. In Switzerland, penetration from abroad
remained low, and the major Swiss banks continued
to carry the financial centre. The City, however,
underwent a far-reaching transformation as foreign
players began to acquire increasing power (Roberts
and Kynaston, 2002). At the end of the 1970s, the
City consisted of a multitude of independent British
actors. At the dawn of the 21st century, most of the
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prestigious British merchant banks had been bought
by the major foreign banks. Power, as at this point,
was concentrated in the hands of around 15 major
foreign banks – American, Japanese, German and
. . . Swiss.
The decline, or difficult reconversion, of the traditional
productive regions In Switzerland, since 1975 the
industrial regions had moved into new high-added-
value activities or had declined. All mass production
had disappeared. In sectors where there was a lot of
international competition, such as chemicals and
watch making, there were massive job losses and
major relocations. The LEs had extricated
themselves in good time, often to the detriment of
their native region (Corpataux and Crevoisier, 2001;
Crevoisier et al., 2001; Corpataux et al., 2002).
Three main developments can be noted in the
traditional industrial regions:
• A move to high-added-value activities. The
traditional industries (pharmaceuticals, watch
making, machine manufacture, textiles) all
developed new products. In this way, watch
making increased the average price of its watches
considerably. For the year 1995, with almost 40m
finished watches exported, Switzerland’s share of
the world market by volume was under 10
percent, but the corresponding share by value
stood at over 65 percent of export sales achieved
by the world market (F.H., 1997).
• The disappearance of many SMEs and a marked
reduction in the number of jobs. The watch-
making industry, very concentrated spatially, saw
its jobs vanish. In the Jura Arc, a space which in
1995 contained almost 65 percent of jewellery
and watch-making jobs, the workforce went from
over 48,000 jobs in 1975 to around 23,000 in
1995.
• Finally, the relocation of activities abroad was
very marked across the whole industrial sector.
This relocation was marked in the regions with
high numbers of LEs which, in contrast to
SMEs, had the capacity, organizationally and
financially, to internationalize. In the Basel
region, for example, the numbers of those
working in the chemical industry, which
underpinned the whole region, fell by 12 percent
between 1975 and 1995, while Basel’s LEs in this
sector increased their international
competitiveness by specializing in high-added-
value finished products. Rising research and
manufacturing costs in Switzerland coincided
with the attraction of relatively low foreign
investment costs. Acquisitions and direct
investments had multiplied since the end of the
1970s, to a point where jobs abroad were in a
large majority.
The tourist regions had not evolved in the same way
as the industrial regions because it was not possible
to increase productivity to the same degree. By its
very nature, tourist activity has little scope for
automation, for example. Plus, the potential for
innovation by establishments (hotels, restaurants,
etc.), was not as great as in industry.
Competitiveness was therefore mainly sought by
squeezing costs and this was done in two ways.
First, by huge recourse to poorly qualified, poorly
paid foreign labour, which explains the relatively
good performance of these regions on employment.
The second approach to reducing costs was a move
from hotel-based tourism to non-hotel-based
accommodation and services, which was cheaper.
However, this evolution came to an abrupt halt at
the start of the 1990s, when the structural limits of
this development were reached. It was no longer
possible to avoid crisis by squeezing costs. These
regions entered a period of crisis, with particularly
serious repercussions for the construction sector.
Although most Western countries saw the
proportion of jobs in the manufacturing industries
compared to the workforce as a whole decrease
during the 1970s, this movement was particularly
marked in the United Kingdom. While this
proportion varied between 35 and 45 percent of the
total workforce on average between 1860 and 1970,
it did not exceed 30 percent in 1980 and dropped to
below 25 percent at the beginning of the 1990s.
Sectors such as the automobile industry, mechanical
construction, metallurgy, textiles and clothing were
hit particularly hard (Esposito, 1993).
This movement went hand in hand with an
increase in regional disparities. To the traditionally
peripheral regions (Scotland, the north of England,
Wales, Northern Ireland) – specialized in the produc-
tion of coal, steel or textiles and which were already
in decline in the 1960s – were added the regions of
central England (the Midlands, Yorkshire,
Humberside, etc.). From the 1970s onwards, regions
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that specialized in sectors such as automobiles or
chemistry experienced difficulties (Esposito, 1993).
In terms of employment , a short comparison
between the UK and Switzerland from 1980 to 2000
shows that the shares of the primary and secondary
sectors were at any time more developed in
Switzerland. As a corollary the part of tertiary
sector was more important in the UK (Table 1).
Thus the process of deindustrialization seems
especially severe in Britain (for a more detailed
analysis of such transformations at a national as well
as at a regional scale in the UK, see Mohan, 1999).
Concentration of activities and economic power in
international financial metropolises During the past
30 years, Switzerland has been evolving towards a
‘head office economy’ that specializes in managing
and organizing multinational production and
controlling the flow of international funds. As a
result, beyond the apparently satisfactory macro-
economic indicators, some considerable regional
imbalances appeared. There was the development of
a financial ‘head office’ economy in the metropolitan
regions and the successful internationalization of
the country’s largest enterprises. But corresponding
to this was either the disappearance of industrial,
and to a lesser extent tourist, SMEs or a
concentration of businesses in activities which were
very high added value, but involved considerable job
losses. Moreover, in cities such as Zurich or Geneva,
the rising real-estate price resulting from the
expansion of the financial centre and other related
services accelerated the relocation of industry
outside the urban centre. In this perspective the
Swiss economy’s export base has evolved
considerably in economic and spatial terms.
The dual evolution experienced by the UK was
even more marked. One region in the South-east
that houses a world-scale financial centre prospered,
while the rest of the country had been crying out for
industrial redevelopment for several decades. This
provoked a ‘north–south divide’ (Martin, 1988).
The economic power was also concentrated in the
South-east, as 182 out of the 300 leading British
firms had their head office in London (Farnetti,
1996).
Significant institutional differences
Some studies give an account of the institutional
differences displayed by the two countries. Until the
early 1990s, two important differences were evident:
first, the two systems for controlling listed
companies differed; second, the ties binding LEs
and national territory were looser in the UK than in
Switzerland.
The system for controlling listed companies According
to David et al. (2001), the Swiss model had three
characteristic features until the early 1990s: first, the
power of control was highly concentrated and
spread among a small number of shareholders;
second, there were well-established, long-term
relationships linking banks and industry; third,
there were measures aimed at protecting LEs from
hostile or foreign takeovers.
By comparing six countries (Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Germany, France, the UK, USA),
Windolf and Nollert (2001) show that, at the
beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of
shareholders holding 50 percent or more of share
capital was still very high in Switzerland (31.1
Table 1 Employment by sectors in the UK and Switzerland (1980–2000)
Secondary sector, % of the
Primary sector, % of the total total employment in the Tertiary sector, % of the total
employment in the country country employment in the country
Years UK Switz. UK Switz. UK Switz.
1980 2.3 6.9 34.8 38.1 62.9 55.0
1990 2.2 4.2 27.5 32.2 70.3 63.6
2000 1.8 4.5 21.6 26.4 76.7 69.1
Source: OFS (Swiss Federal Statistical Office), ONS (Office for National Statistics).
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percent). Only Germany had a higher percentage
(51 percent). Moreover, a high proportion of Swiss
multinationals were still in the hands of one person
or a limited number of people. The proportion of
LEs controlled by one individual, or a single family,
was very high (31.1 percent) and even higher than
the figure observed in Germany (18.9 percent).
In the UK, the situation was different because
shareholdings were much more scattered: the figure
for shareholders holding less than 25 percent of
share capital was over 90 percent, a percentage
exceeded only by the USA, with 99.9 percent. In
Germany and Switzerland, the figures for
shareholders holding less than 25 percent of share
capital were far lower – they stood at 53.3 percent
and 35.1 percent respectively.
The relationship between banks and industry
was more significant in Switzerland than in the UK.
At the beginning of the 1990s, in the UK and in the
USA, the banks held less than 1 percent of the shares
in listed companies, compared to 4.7 percent and 10
percent in Switzerland and Germany respectively
(Birchler, 1995). Moreover, the banks had an impor-
tant role to play in managing companies because in
Switzerland there was a system of proxy voting which
authorized the banks to represent minority share-
holders at shareholders’ meetings (David et al., 2001).
There were additional measures to protect Swiss
LEs and make them highly ‘invisible’ to foreign
investors. For example, the share capital of public
limited companies is made up of bearer shares,
registered shares and participation certificates.
These different categories of stock each bestow
distinct rights. Until very recently, Swiss law
allowed boards of directors a free hand, as long as
the statutes permitted it, to accept or refuse – often
arbitrarily – the registration of new investors in the
register of members. It was equally easy to exclude
minority shareholders from the decision-making
process (Guex and Pasquier-Dorthe, 1996). It
should also be added that, unlike Germany, there
was no law obliging companies to involve their
employees in the decision-making process, as the
principle of employee involvement and co-
management was not institutionalized. Moreover,
when compared internationally, Swiss companies
had, until recently, a reputation for being among
those whose policies on information about
performance and results were the least transparent
(Guex and Pasquier-Dorthe, 1996).
These various institutions made the country’s
LEs unattractive to foreign investors and so
protected them from ‘unfriendly’ takeover bids
(David et al., 2001). The Swiss model may have
changed little before the start of the 1990s, but the
rest of that decade was to prove rich in reforms.
Articulation between LEs and national territory In the
UK, the relationship between LEs and national
territory was very loose. Numerous economists and
historians have highlighted the very early-flowering
internationalization of British capitalism.
Nevertheless, Farnetti (1995; 1996) argues that the
liberal policies of the 1980s, which had resulted
among other things in the liberalization of the
financial sector, made the dual development of the
British economy even more pronounced. He puts
forward as evidence the parallel between, on the one
hand, the good performance of Britain’s largest
companies, particularly their internationalization
and their good stock-market performance, and, on
the other hand, the decline in the rest of the
country’s economy. Farnetti dissects the sources of
finance for the main mergers/acquisitions in recent
years. Strictly speaking, he does not construct a
theory, but simply defends the thesis that the
competitive advantage of British firms stems
primarily from having privileged access to financial
markets that are particularly well developed and
liquid. This privileged access to financial markets
had favoured the move towards internationalization
of the British multinationals via mergers/acquisitions,
to the detriment of areas such as investment in
research and development. To sum up, although the
British multinationals remain connected to the City
of London and to the economy of the South-east
because they have their head offices there, they are
no longer truly linked to the rest of the British
economy because they hardly invest there. Other
authors put forward the argument that under-
investment is structural and cripples any industrial
renewal (Hutton, 1995). Thus, gross fixed-capital
formation compared to GDP is traditionally lower
in the UK than in Switzerland (Figure 2).
How can these similarities in evolution between
the two countries be explained? Let us now consider
the interpretations than can be made using the
theories.
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Financial markets and capital mobility/
liquidity: the theoretical positions and the
reforms undertaken in the UK and in
Switzerland
Reforms aimed at liberalizing capital movement, at
national and international level, and at improving
the operational efficiency of the financial markets
had increased the mobility/liquidity of capital.
Liquidity – i.e. the capacity that allows economic
(particularly financial) players to withdraw their
investments at any time and re-invest them
elsewhere – is actually the corollary of mobility. But
do such reforms then mean that this increased capital
mobility/liquidity has homogenous, beneficial reper-
cussions for all the players comprising a national
economy? The theoretical positions diverge. For
some, financial markets exist solely to enable an
optimal allocation of productive capital and
everyone is in a position to benefit from the perfect,
free circulation of capital. For others, financial
markets were invented quite simply to make capital-
ownership rights liquid and mobile. The relationship
between the financial markets and the actual
economy is, moreover, complex and contradictory.
We will present these two positions and comment on
the reforms undertaken in Switzerland and the UK.
Financial markets and capital mobility/
liquidity: the theoretical positions
The neoclassical theory of efficient financial markets
assumes that the perfect, free circulation of capital
leads to the optimal allocation of productive capital.
That being the case, completely deregulated
financial markets should be enough to ensure an
optimal allocation of financial resources. In the
absence of statutory barriers, nothing should, in
effect, prevent profitable projects from being funded
because in this pure and perfect world, every
opportunity for profit is obliged to be seized by
investors (Brossard, 2001). As Dow and Rodriguez-
Fuentes (1998) observe, most neoclassical
economists furthermore consider that regulating the
financial system can only be negative, because
financial intermediation must be more costly or less
efficient. Moreover, financial liberalization will not
only enable intermediation costs to be reduced, but
will also cause funding instruments to multiply
(Brossard, 2001).
In short, for neoclassical theorists, the
advantages which must flow from the free
circulation of capital are numerous and the
drawbacks non-existent: every good project will be
able to get finance at the lowest cost and the range of
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funding instruments will expand . . . for all
categories of borrower, independently of where they
are located, of course. In the final analysis, the
financial markets are only there to estimate at best
the fundamental value of companies and, in short,
distribute productive capital in an optimal way
(Orléan, 2000). This aside, the concept of liquidity
is not the subject of any particular theoretical
development (Orléan, 1999).
These being the cases, reforms encouraging the
free circulation of capital only serve to bring reality
closer to this model. By axiom, any measure which
brings reality closer to this world is beneficial. In
fact, the question does not arise in those terms: the
territory exists, with its structures and its
constraints; capital is not, and never will be,
perfectly mobile; markets are not, and never will be,
efficient; economic players are not, and never will
be, equal; etc.
Mid-way between the theoretical and the
practical, Orléan (1999; 2000), for his part,
considers that if the organized financial markets
were invented, it was to make capital ownership rights
liquid. The institutional reforms undergone by the
financial markets during the past 20 years attest to
this, as the reforms were all aimed at promoting
greater liquidity. In effect, liquidity alleviates the
risk engendered by capital immobilization, because
it offers economic players the opportunity to
withdraw their investments at any time. Yet, this
opportunity can only be offered by huge, well-
established financial markets that are kept buoyant
by high transaction volumes (Lordon, 2000). This
idea of a preference for liquidity is not new: Keynes
had already stated it. In a context of uncertainty that
is regarded as radical, the economic players develop
a preference for liquidity: out of two assets (financial
or tangible), they will always prefer the one which,
all other things being equal, is the more liquid, that
is, the one that can be most easily transformed into
cash (Boncoeur and Thouément, 1993).
Policies of liberalizing capital movement are
primarily aimed at ensuring a perfect, free
circulation of capital. But this perfect mobility of
capital would remain very imperfect, or would not
exist at all, if it could not rely on sufficiently liquid
financial markets. It seems to us, therefore, that the
real challenge for a process of liberalization lies in
ensuring maximum capital mobility/liquidity. Two
types of institutional reform are therefore required:
first, reforms aimed at removing statutory barriers,
since these barriers impede the perfect, free
circulation of capital; and second, reforms aimed at
reinforcing the operational efficiency of the financial
markets, that is, aimed at promoting liquidity and
transparency. This point is now examined using the
reforms undertaken in the UK and Switzerland.
UK and Swiss reforms aimed at increasing
capital mobility/liquidity
In the 1970s, a wave of capital-movement
liberalization started in the USA and then swept up,
to varying degrees, other countries and other
markets. This saw the removal of exchange controls
by the UK in 1979, the partial opening-up of the
Japanese financial market in 1983–84, the liberal-
ization of capital movements in Europe (as required
by the Single European Act), etc. (Bourguinat, 2000).
Thus, capital mobility/liquidity was increased by
a number of factors pertaining to national legislation
(decartelization, ‘Big Bang’, lowering stamp duty,
relaxing conditions for pension-fund investment,
etc.) and pertaining in particular to the interaction
of the political and economic players who were in a
position to support these legislative changes.
In the United Kingdom, a virtually full
liberalization of the financial system, known as the
Big Bang, took place in 1986. Until this date, the
members of the London Stock Exchange – who
collectively owned the institution – had been
governed by operating rules and rules of good
behaviour whose origins dated back to its creation in
1812. The Big Bang did away with numerous
secular rules (Esposito, 1993). First, the scale of
fixed commissions was abolished: this resulted in a
growth of competition and a sharp rise in
transactions. Second, it was decided to open up the
market completely: although since 1982 the British
and foreign banks had been permitted to hold up to
29.9 percent of the capital in a firm quoted on the
stock exchange, the Big Bang increased this portion
to 100 percent, leaving the door open to control
from outside the City. Third, the principle of
permitting jobbers and brokers alone to issue shares
and to provide counterpart and investment services
was revised: this resulted in an increase to the
number of categories able to intervene on the market.
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In Switzerland, the economic recession at the
start of the 1990s brought about a series of
institutional reforms – decartelization – aimed at
increasing competition and strengthening market
mechanisms. These reforms also covered the domestic
banking sector – highly cartelized until then – and
most banking agreements and conventions were
removed at the start of the 1990s (ASB, 1999).
At the same time, with the liberalization of their
competitors’ financial markets, Switzerland’s
traditional advantages were eroded. Reforms aimed
at favouring the operational efficiency of the Swiss
financial market (i.e., at promoting liquidity and
transparency) were implemented in various areas: a
revision of the law on public limited companies and
shareholder rights (Guex and Pasquier-Dorthe,
1996); the introduction of on-line dealing; and the
introduction of rules and accounting practices that
gave more transparency (David et al., 2001).
Did these reforms aimed at increasing capital
mobility/liquidity have beneficial, homogenous
repercussions for all categories of player, all sectors
and all regions? Or did those repercussions vary?
These are the questions which the next two sections
seek to answer for the two countries, using various
theoretical approaches.
Liberalization of capital movement, liquidity
preference and regions
Sheila Dow, from a post-Keynesian viewpoint, has
linked the endogenous money concept to the spatial
problems. Starting from factors such as the banking
system’s power of monetary creation, the spatial
structure of the financial system and its evolution
plus liquidity preference, Dow seeks to show that
possibilities exist for rationing credit, not only to
certain categories of borrower but also to certain
regions.
Contribution of endogenous money theories
Some authors, mainly post-Keynesians, consider
money as endogenous. They think that the central
bank no longer has a monopoly on the money-
supply mechanism. Money becomes endogenous,
because it results from a demand of the economic
system and no longer simply from the wishes of an
external institution, in this case the central bank
(Monvoisin, 2000). Monetary creation occurs
through the banking system coming into direct
contact with economic activity. Money is credit and
therefore pre-exists production. Given this, analysis
of the place and time when money filters into the
economy becomes crucial if one is seeking to under-
stand its effects (Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes,
1998).
Some post-Keynesians, known as horizontalists
(including Kaldor and Moore), think that money
supply (including the monetary base) is totally
endogenous. The monetary authorities are in a
position to set interest rates but do not influence the
amount of money in circulation. Moreover, and this
is a major subject of debate even within the post-
Keynesian movement, horizontalists argue that the
commercial banks, in their turn, are passive because
they mechanically supply the economic agents with
the credit they request (Nasica, 1997). For example,
Moore (1988) maintains that in practice LEs enjoy
pre-agreed banking arrangements which enable
them to negotiate new credit lines, and even
overdraft facilities, at any time. The banks cannot
refuse these requests because they risk losing their
biggest customers. To sum up, for horizontalists, the
total amount of credit granted is determined
entirely by companies’ funding demands.
For other authors – the structuralists – monetary
endogenousness does not necessarily go hand in
hand with commercial bank passivity. The latter
have the option of rationing credit (Monvoisin,
2000). Dow (1996) tries to reconcile these two
approaches while also incorporating a spatial
dimension. Dow’s thinking pulls together studies by
some regulationist and conventionist authors, for
whom liquidity, and the preference which economic
(particularly financial) players develop for it, play a
central role in the evolution and operation of
contemporary market finance-based economies.
Stages of banking-system development
For Dow (1999), the banking system goes through
various stages of development. She identifies six
stages and goes on to try to show that from a certain
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stage, the contribution of the financial sector to the
productive sector can become ambiguous.
In the first stage, the bank plays the single role of
pure financial intermediary: it takes in and lends
local savings deposits. Stage 5, which was reached at
the end of the 1970s, corresponds to the emergence
of non-banking competitors who carry out this
intermediation. 
The banks are forced to become much more pro-active,
seeking lending opportunities and the deposits to match
them, that is to engage in liability management. This is
where financial expansion starts to take on a life of its
own, driven by the banks’ concern over market share
rather than the financing needs of borrowers in the
productive sector. (Dow, 1999: 38–9)
It is also at this stage that the banks have a tendency
to over-lend, to accumulate bad debts and to fuel
speculation. At Stage 6:
Monetary authorities, no longer able to control the
supply of credit, turned to capital requirements in an
effort to constrain the volume of credit. [. . .] The
outcome was the development of securitisation
(Gardener, 1988). Banks turned existing loans into
marketable securities and developed the provision of
financial services in securities markets, facilitating
borrowing by means of issuing securities, rather than
lending directly themselves. (Dow, 1999: 39)
Dow goes on to develop the relationship between
the evolution of the financial sector and the
corresponding spatial structures (see Table 2 for an
overview of the spatial implications of the stages of
banking development). Up to and including Stage 5,
the financial system is regional, then national. At
Stage 5, competition starts between the banks and
other non-banking financial institutions. The
system becomes more and more autonomous. The
various financial players seek to capture market
share through a policy of actively canvassing sales.
More money is created and the economy is
generously irrigated. Finally, in Stage 6,
deregulation opens up international competition.
The monetary authorities seek new ways to contain
monetary creation. This allows national financial
centres to come to the fore. Spatial concentration
Table 2 The spatial implications of the stages of banking development
Banks and space Credit and space
Stage 1: Serving local communities Intermediation only
Wealth-based, providing foundation
for future financial centres
Stage 2: Market dependent on extent of Credit creation focused on local
confidence held in banker community because total credit constrained
by redeposit ratio
Stage 3: Banking system develops at national level Redeposit constraint relaxed somewhat, so
can lend wider afield
Stage 4: Central bank oversees national system, Banks freer to respond to credit demand as
but limited power to constrain credit reserves constraint not binding and they
can determine volume and distribution of
credit within national economy
Stage 5: Banks compete at national level with Credit creation determined by struggle over
non-bank financial institutions market share and opportunities in
speculative markets. Total credit uncontrolled
Stage 6: Deregulation opens up international Shift to liquidity with emphasis put on
competition, eventually causing services rather than credit; credit decisions
concentration in financial centres concentrated in financial centres; total
credit determined by availability of capital, 
i.e. by central capital markets
Source: Dow (1999).
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takes place on the international scale too. The
intermediation function becomes secondary and
capital is procured via national and international
financial markets. The proportion of banks’ profits
from fees and charges increases relative to loan
interest. If banks still lend, they supply more and
more services that enable their customers to get
funding on the markets, while at the same time they
remain powerful players in those markets.
The evolution of the banking system and its
spatial distribution will jointly determine the power
of monetary creation in each region. At Stage 6,
liberalization–deregulation is at the root of a move
to spatial concentration of financial activities. Dow
draws a number of conclusions about the regional
impact of a process of liberalization. What are they?
The SME/LE dichotomy
Dow places much emphasis on the fact that these
stages of development are characteristic of a process
that sees the banks increase their capacity for
monetary creation. Banks at Stage 6 have developed
sophisticated techniques for protecting their
liquidity, while banks at an earlier stage of
development are constrained by less liquid assets.
From a regional viewpoint, this assertion is
important because it means that borrowers in
regions where the banking system is typically at an
earlier stage of development will be subject to
greater funding constraints. Thus, in a context of
spatially concentrated financial activities, the
response of the banking system to credit requests
will vary significantly between regions, but also
between categories of borrower (Dow, 1999).
First of all, the decline of less competitive
regional and local banks – the same banks that feed
the regional economy – will weaken the power of
monetary creation in non-central regions, and, in
the end, break the regional funding circuits. Yet,
SMEs are the ones who normally depend on those
circuits; traditionally, SMEs find their funding
locally, either via bank loans or via local markets for
equity capital. SMEs are not normally listed
companies and do not have direct access to national
or international financial markets. Next, the banks,
with high liquidity and grouped in one or more
financial centre(s), will prove hesitant to lend to
non-central regions and particularly to SMEs in
those regions: SMEs will be systematically rationed.
Note that this estrangement does not correspond to
physical distance alone, but applies equally to
relational non-proximity.
A process of liberalization will, however, benefit
LEs. Dow, following Moore, argues that LEs take
advantage of facilities through their banker(s) and
suffer few funding constraints. Dow (1998) also
argues that a process of integration based on a
perfect, free circulation of capital, such as the
European integration process, will favour LEs. As
the neoclassical theory of the efficiency of financial
markets suggests, liberalization can in fact improve
funding conditions for – obviously – companies
which are plugged into the financial markets.
As Allégret (2001) observes, the financial
reforms undertaken in France triggered the
formation of a dual funding system. The financial
changes of the 1980s did not facilitate SME access
to external sources of finance; the development of
market finance had the effect of increasing the
investors’ requirement for liquidity. Thus, the
growing sophistication of financial systems has,
paradoxically, not led to easier funding for SMEs. In
this context, LEs have a considerably wider range of
funding instruments at their disposal – principally
the financial markets, securitized debt negotiable on
the money market and bank loans – while SMEs
have remained dependent on bank funding and
cannot take advantage of the modernized French
financial system. As a result, Allégret is able to
conclude: ‘the balance of power between banks and
SMEs has remained favourable to the former, while
the balance of power between banks and large
companies has evolved in a way that is unfavourable
to the bank’ (2001: 15).
All this has important repercussions for the
development of regions made up of SMEs. The
absence, or progressive disappearance, of traditional
funding channels in these regions sooner or later
gives rise to takeovers of expanding SMEs by LEs,
often from outside the region (Crevoisier, 1998).
This in turn results in loss of regional decision-
making autonomy. However, the corollary of this
shift of decision-making centres to outside the
region is a shift of financial accumulation centres.
This situation can compromise the future
development of the regions involved because it
‘signifies that there is, somewhere, a confiscation of
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the fruits of endogenous development and of
innovative regional dynamics by the largest centres
(economic and geographical)’ (Crevoisier, 1998: 637).
The theory of liquidity preference: systematic
vulnerability of non-central regions?
Dow (1992; 1994) thus extended her liquidity
preference theory to the habitual financial behaviour
of the economic agents (banks, but also savers and
investors). She considers that because of an often
difficult history, for any given state of confidence,
the non-central regions are more vulnerable,
economically and financially, than the centres. The
economic agents there develop what she calls a
defensive financial behaviour, a consequence of
which is stronger liquidity preference.2 The
economic agents tend to abandon investment in
non-central productive activities in favour of
centrally issued financial products: 
The systematic vulnerability of peripheral economies
would encourage high liquidity preference. That would
take the form on the one hand of a preference for
holding assets in relatively liquid form (discouraging
purchase of capital goods and encouraging purchase of
centre-issued financial assets); on the other hand it
would discourage borrowing. (Dow, 1992: 621)
For Dow, the regional credit supply depends
therefore on three factors: first, it will be
determined by the monetary-creation power of the
regional banking system – a power which is linked
to the banking system’s stage of development;
second, liquidity preference affects the willingness
of the banks to lend at regional level; and third,
liquidity preference also influences the behaviour of
savers. For example, a pessimistic outlook on the
future of a saver’s own region or prolonged
recession will increase liquidity preference: savers
will lean towards shares and government securities,
as they are more liquid. They are, of course, issued
by the financial centres. Those centres will therefore
suck in the flow of savings deposits that originate
non-centrally. If there is a local or regional banking
fabric with a strong power of monetary creation
then this outflow of capital may be offset. If not,
regional financial resources will diminish (Dow and
Rodrigues-Fuentes, 1997). Where the demand for
credit is concerned, pessimism or recession will
deter investors from borrowing and, in the end,
from committing themselves to new projects. Note
that for post-Keynesians, again, supply and demand
interact: pessimism from savers and bankers can
engender pessimism in investors and vice versa. A
vicious or virtuous circle can start up.
In brief, Dow puts forward the argument that the
power of monetary creation in each region and the
economic agents’ liquidity preference are key factors
in understanding today’s spatial imbalances. If we
follow Dow, the liberalization of capital movements
can only exacerbate existing regional disparities. On
the one hand, it will weaken the power of monetary
creation in non-central regions by decimating local
and regional banks, which are less competitive than
the major banks located in the centres. On the other
hand, the already high liquidity preference of non-
central economic agents will increase: the increased
drainage of funds towards financial centres will
reinforce the vulnerability of non-central regions.
It is clear that Sheila Dow’s ideas raise
fundamental questions at a time when financial-
sector development seems to be calling into question
the unity of national economies. However, she does
not cover exchange-rate issues in any great detail.
The next section demonstrates that the free
international circulation of capital has major
repercussions on the evolution of exchange rates. In
both Switzerland and the UK, the national
currencies are traditionally considered as strong and
tend to appreciate periodically. A strong,
appreciating currency constitutes an undeniable
advantage for an international financial centre.
Nevertheless, its repercussions are not homogenous
across a national territory: on the one hand, it
favours the internationalization of LEs and the
development of financial centres while, on the other
hand, it penalizes the industrial and tourist regions
and particularly SMEs based in those regions.
A strong, periodically appreciating
currency: what are the repercussions at
regional level?
All countries have introduced reforms aimed at
increasing capital mobility/liquidity. It now seems
easy to make capital circulate at the international
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level – this is the phenomenon generally known as
financial globalization. Nevertheless, when it turns
out (to take just one example) that the volume of
transactions on the foreign-exchange market is
approximately 60 times greater than the volume of
international trade (de Brunhoff and Jetin, 2000)
and that those movements are now what largely
determine exchange rates, it is legitimate to ask
questions about the repercussions of exchange-rate
variation on national economies.
Thus, periods of turbulence and uncertainty
arise and huge inflows of capital provoke a sudden
appreciation of the currencies that investors and
financial operators judge the safest. But the
currencies renowned for their ‘quality’ come from a
limited number of countries. Furthermore, those
countries are home to the largest international
financial centres, the very same ones that suck in an
ever-growing share of international funds. For the
countries that house these international financial
centres, such as Switzerland and the UK, the
potential risk of their currency appreciating is high.
So, what are the possible regional repercussions of
an appreciation in a currency’s value on the external
market? This point is examined in the following
sections.
Exchange-rate evolution of the Swiss franc
and the pound sterling
In Switzerland in the first half of the 1970s, in line
with monetarist recommendations, the central bank
decided to let the franc float on the external market
and to pursue a monetary policy aimed at stable
growth in the domestic money supply. The outcome
was an almost continuous appreciation of the Swiss
franc on the foreign-exchange market between 1973
and early 1996. Figure 3 illustrates this
appreciation, measured against a basket of
currencies including Switzerland’s 15 main trading
partners. Note that the Swiss franc has not
appreciated since 1996. It has stabilized at a
relatively high level compared to the mark and the
euro but, in common with the main trading
currencies that comprise the euro, it has weakened
seriously against the dollar and the pound sterling.
Maintaining the pound sterling at high external
levels is a long-time and recurrent debate in UK
history (see Coakley and Harris, 1983). Remember,
too, the unrealistic level at which the pound sterling
joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in
1990 before leaving under some speculative attacks
in September 1992. More generally, a monetarist
framework was adopted in 1979 in the UK and since
then the pound sterling has floated freely with the
exception of the short-lived participation in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Even vis-a-vis
strong currencies such as the Swiss franc, the pound
sterling stayed at relatively high levels and
underwent some important appreciations over the
last 30 years. Note particularly the years following
1979, 1987 and 1996 (see Figure 3).
Free international circulation of capital,
strong currency and financial centres: what are
the relationships?
Is it possible to imagine strong international
financial centres operating in countries with a weak
currency? That is to say, in countries where there is
no great degree of confidence in the economic,
financial and political institutions? The answer to
this reductio ad absurdum is: certainly not.
We would remark, first and foremost, that the
free international circulation of capital has
strengthened the position of the most renowned
international financial centres in the countries at the
‘centre’. Those centres have been able to profit from
certain traditional competitive advantages; they have
created new ones – reforms favouring capital
mobility/liquidity come to mind here – and
furthermore they have been able to get them to
operate concurrently. A strong currency magnifies
this success because it illustrates the confidence
which investors and financial operators have in the
economic, political and – above all – the financial
institutions of the country concerned.
Clearly, the Swiss franc and – maybe to a lesser
degree – the pound sterling benefit from this
confidence: these currencies convey the image of a
‘strong’ currency and act as refuge currencies
during periods of instability in the foreign-exchange
market. In parallel, the potential risk of these
currencies appreciating is higher. In effect, the
mimetic, self-validating behaviour patterns of
investors and financial operators reinforces these
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currencies in their role as refuge currencies, at the
obvious risk of pushing them up still further.
Economists at major Swiss banks which are
heavily involved in international business made no
mistake about this. A study by UBS (2000) did not
beat about the bush in maintaining that Switzerland
and its financial market were well advised to preserve
an autonomous monetary policy and therefore not
link the evolution of the Swiss franc to that of the
euro. The Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS)
economists went so far as to consider that floating
the franc – and particularly its possible appreciation
– constituted a decisive advantage for the Swiss
financial market and did not represent, under any
circumstances, a handicap for the Swiss export
industry! Those same economists also put forward the
idea that if the Swiss franc had to follow the European
currency, the franc might lose some credibility.
Free international circulation of capital,
competitive advantages amassed over the years and a
strong currency have clearly strengthened London’s
and Zurich’s function as international capital hubs.
At the same time, financial innovation and the capacity
of financial centres to transform companies’ tangible
assets into liquid securities negotiable on the stock
markets have each given rise to an estrangement
from the investment sites and have conferred on the
financial centre(s) a capacity for spatial trade-off
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1997) between the regional,
the national and the international. These financial
centres now concentrate the power of monetary
creation and a wide-ranging capacity for spatial trade-
off which enables them quite simply to continuously
revalue the capital invested – reversibility is almost
total – and to reallocate it, in accordance with
standard criteria, anywhere on the planet.
While a strong currency with an underlying
tendency to appreciate suits the international financial
centres – as we have shown for Switzerland
(Corpataux and Crevoisier, 2001; Crevoisier et al.,
2001; Corpataux et al., 2002), it can have diverse
effects on the other regions. From the point of view
of theory, we have used two criteria to assess the
regional impact of an appreciating currency:
sectoral specialization and the dominance (or not) of
LEs in a region.
Regional sectoral specializations and the
SME/LE dichotomy
First criterion: regional sectoral specialization.
While an appreciation in the national currency
supports, and has a positive influence on,
international financial centres, regions which special-
ize in traditional productive activities, particularly
industry and tourism, are negatively exposed. Faced
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with an appreciation in the external value of their
currency, their exports, whether in terms of manu-
factured goods or tourist numbers, are penalized.
Second criterion: the SME/LE dichotomy.
Traditionally, theory teaches us that an increase in
the external value of a currency prompts companies
to invest abroad. In actual fact, only LEs have the
financial and organizational capacity to implement a
strategy of international expansion and relocation,
even though they already have privileged access to
national and international financial markets.
Conversely, SMEs do not have the financial and
organizational capacity to even consider relocation
and multinationalization. In this context, and faced
with an appreciating currency, a region mainly made
up of SMEs will be confronted with additional
problems in exporting.
The lines of thinking we have called on give a
rather convincing image of the similarity of the
economic and spatial transformations undergone by
the UK and Switzerland during the course of the
last two or three decades. However, there were still
significant institutional differences between these
two countries until the 1990s: their system for
controlling listed companies was different and the
articulation between LEs and national territory
seemed to be looser in the UK. Although some
reforms – comparable between the two countries
and in both cases favouring increased capital
mobility/liquidity – have made these differences
less marked, a number of theories nevertheless
attempt to explain them. In fact, those theories
underscore the influence – whether dominant or
marginal – that liquidity exercises in two stylized
models of capitalism. They help to explain the
differences that characterized the Swiss and UK
economies until the start of the 1990s and – in our
view – they explain in part the differing
performance of Swiss and UK LEs. The next
section takes a brief look at those theories.
Differences between stylized models of
capitalism and the system for controlling
listed companies and liquidity 
Orléan (1999) thus distinguishes two stylized
models of capitalism with distinct financial
structures: on the one hand, a Rhenish model; on
the other hand, an Anglo-Saxon model. The Rhenish
model is characterized by a small number of listed
companies, a small number of shareholders, concen-
trated shareholdings and the banks having an
important place, including holding capital. Liquidity
only has a very marginal influence on the functioning
of so-called ‘Rhenish’ economies. The Anglo-Saxon
model is characterized by a high number of listed
companies, a large number of shareholders,
scattered shareholdings and the banks having only a
very limited role. In this model the financial markets
are highly developed and liquidity plays a pivotal role.
The Rhenish model: internal controls and
marginal influence of liquidity
In the Rhenish model – Germany is the
embodiment of our first model of capitalism3 – the
concentration of capital allows a system of internal
control by the main shareholders, in particular the
major banks. The latter therefore play a pivotal role
because, on the one hand, they supply companies
with credit and, on the other hand, they also take
part in managing and monitoring those companies,
as a shareholder with often sizeable holdings. This
system has little transparency, but it does confer a
high degree of organizational stability and enables
close, long-term relationships to be developed
between banks and industry. This banking power
stems from a position of strength built on
information which is private, plentiful and secret as
well as on a regular, long-term bilateral relationship.
Capital ownership is stabilized by an interplay of
internal controls and cross-holdings, mainly by the
banks, and leaves only a marginal place for the
market (Orléan, 1999). Liquidity is only marginally
involved. This type of capitalism is ‘blocked’ and
proximity between the banks, the other major
shareholders and the companies remains essential.
The Anglo-Saxon model: external controls
and dominant influence of liquidity
In the Anglo-Saxon model – the USA and the UK
embody this second model of capitalism – highly
developed financial markets with sufficient liquidity
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plus minority, scattered shareholders make direct
control of firms very difficult and, above all, very
costly. The shareholders therefore exercise no direct
control, ex ante, over management but can put
pressure on senior management by threatening to
withdraw their capital (defection). It is therefore a
matter of control ‘at arm’s length’, ex post, based on
company results, but with no direct involvement in
managing the firm (Paillard and Amable, 2000).
This external arm’s-length management requires
transparency and therefore standardized, easily
transmittable information. Investors and financial
operators must have a ‘level playing field’ for all the
companies they are valuing or assessing.
But, for Orléan (2000), this logic of liquidity-
centred finance is no longer necessarily linked to
long capital production times. Liquidity even
imposes a dislocation between production time and
funding time: ‘While building productive capital is a
process that comes into the long-term category
because it requires the irreversible immobilisation of
capital, liquidity produces unending opportunities
for revaluation and profit’ (pp. 54–5). This high
liquidity enables shareholders to withdraw at any
time if they feel that a company’s financial results
are unsatisfactory. It therefore confers on them a
power of defection.
The growing power of institutional investors: a
risk to long-term productive investments and to
non-central regions?
The rise in shareholder power, particularly through
institutional investors and the financial management
standards that they bring with them, has only served
to magnify the attraction of liquidity. In the USA,
institutional investors now manage the majority of
financial assets and are imposing a new system of
controlling businesses (Orléan, 2000). This quite
simply aims to reduce the asymmetry of information
between shareholders and managers and to align the
interests of the latter with those of the former
(Lordon, 2000). The financial markets and their
liquidity thus become instruments in the service of a
large number of minority, but powerful, shareholders:
the institutional investors. Those investors have a
very clear objective: to maximize shareholder wealth
by increasing the price of their shares to the
maximum and by increasing dividends (Orléan,
1999). This sums up, in general terms, the notion of
‘creation of shareholder value’. As a result, the listed
company is no longer conceived of as anything but a
set of liquid assets, negotiable at any time according
to a certain number of standard criteria.
For Orléan (1999), as soon as ‘creation of
shareholder value’ is imposed on a company’s
managers as a strategic management aim, the
important question then becomes: what long-term
performance can be produced by a policy that is
dominated by the ‘short-termism’ of market
valuations? By imposing financial performances that
are based on short-term considerations, the
temporal horizon of the firms is dangerously
foreshortened. Clearly, the risk is that some
companies will distribute dividends to satisfy their
shareholders rather than making the investments
needed to maintain their capacity for innovation.
Moreover, in a context of profound
transformation in traditional funding circuits – the
breakdown of regional financial channels and the
concentration of financial activities in a country’s
main financial centre(s) – the growing power of
institutional investors makes a considerable
contribution to increasing regional imbalances.
Remember that those institutional investors are
capturing an ever more substantial share of private
savings, to the detriment of traditional retail-
banking deposits. On the one hand, by diverting
those savings deposits, they are competing with the
regional banks in a field which is traditionally the
preserve of the latter and on which the latter are
heavily dependent. This plays a part, in short, in
placing the regional banks in difficulties. On the
other hand, savings deposits gathered in by pension
funds are not normally reinvested in the region
where they originated. Thus, Martin and Minns
(1995) succeed in showing that the increasing power
of UK pension funds at the end of the 1980s had the
effect of strongly magnifying regional imbalances in
that country. Savings deposits are collected in a
homogenous manner across the whole territory, but
they are funnelled off into financial institutions
which are mainly in the South-east of the country.
Next, these funds are invested mainly on the
London stock market and only listed companies –
basically the large companies – benefit from them.
In practice, almost nothing is reinvested in the other
regions of the country.
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Conclusion
In contrast to the spectacular development of Swiss
and UK international financial centres, their
industrial regions and in some cases their tourist
regions have experienced major problems and are in
general decline. Increased capital mobility/liquidity
has not led to a harmonious allocation of financial
resources. The financial sector has not resolved the
regional imbalances and has not, therefore, played
the regulatory role that, generally speaking,
neoclassical theory attributes to it. On the contrary,
the development of financial activities has reinforced
the dualization (not only sectoral but also spatial) of
the Swiss and UK economies.
By giving some economic players privileged
access to capital and to money creation, the
development of the financial markets brings with it
dualization: on one side, the characteristic
organizations of the global city (large companies,
financial institutions, major banks, financial services,
etc); on the other side, industrial systems made up
of SMEs, regional and local banks, and tourist
regions – all with only indirect access to those
financial channels, but all with heavy needs for long-
term investment.
But, with financial globalization and the strong
development of market finance in every country in
the world, the specificities of the financial structures
developed thus far in the countries of mainland
Europe, and in Switzerland, seem to be becoming
less marked. Some people see in this the end of the
Rhenish model and its alignment with the Anglo-
Saxon model. Others (e.g. Giraud, 2001) observe
that the Anglo-Saxon model is also undergoing
transformation, neither model is going to stop
transforming and they are already in the process of
converging towards ‘something else’.
It is true that the reforms undertaken, for
example in Switzerland, systematically took their
inspiration from the Anglo-Saxon model, but
notable differences remain and, in our view, will
continue to remain. What brings market finance-
based economies closer to each other is mainly that
they give rise to the same exclusions. Increased
capital mobility/liquidity systematically puts
financial centres in a position of strength compared
to regions that specialize in traditional productive
activities and, more particularly, systems made up of
SMEs. Furthermore, this increased
mobility/liquidity has given international financial
centres a greater capacity to arbitrate spatially
between the regional, the national and the
international, independently of the constraints of
distance and traditional geographical scale. This
situation can lead to a loosening of the ties which
connect a financial metropolis to its national territory.
In more general terms, space appears as a very
crucial issue in understanding the functions and the
impacts of the finance industry. Finance consists in
making mobile at very short notice shares that
represent long-lasting capital goods. During the last
20 years it managed particularly well in this task,
building new organizations and new technical
infrastructures which allows an efficient worldwide
circulation of shares.
Regarding its spatial impacts, it gave the power
to capital owners to reallocate financial means
between different regions and nations, that is to say
that the financial industry decides to give a chance
to develop to such or such an industry, region or
firm . . . and of course it can refuse that chance to
others. In such a perspective, it shapes the economic
space, creating new spatial divisions of labour, new
regional specializations and hierarchies.
In this respect, the financial industry of the late
20th century has a comparable impact to the railway
industry at the end of the 19th century. At that time,
the transport of goods made possible economies of
scale and the increase in the specialization of regions
and nations. Today, the financial industry
reorganizes the economic landscape.
Notes
1 Cited by ASB (1996).
2 Note that Dow proposes two versions of her ‘theory of
liquidity preference’: the first, by Dow (1992; 1994; 1999)
herself, is the one we use here: its starting point is a given
state of confidence. Together with Rodriguez-Fuentes
(1997), Dow develops a more sophisticated version
(inspired by Minsky) which accords a major role to
business climate and economic cycles (periods of
recession or expansion). The conclusions differ somewhat
from the first version because the non-central regions
would not experience a continuous decrease in loans
compared to the national total, but would be subject to
greater financial instability. Note, however, a link between
the two versions: Minsky associates strong liquidity
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preference with times of recession, while that preference
is weaker in times of expansion. When Dow considers
that non-central regions are more vulnerable and are
subjected to stronger liquidity preference, she makes it
look a little as if they are in perpetual recession.
3 The Swiss model is readily allied with the Rhenish model,
even though there are undoubtedly some differences. On
this subject, see David et al. (2001).
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